Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM)-based passive fault detection involves modeling the system under test (SUT) as an EFSM M, monitoring the input/output behaviors of the SUT, and determining whether these behaviors relate to faults within the SUT. We propose a new approach for EFSM-based passive fault detection which randomly selects a state in M and checks whether there is a trace in M starting from this state which is compatible with the observed behaviors. If a compatible trace is found, we determine that observed behaviors are not sufficient to declare the SUT to be faulty; otherwise, we check another unchecked state. If all the states have been checked and no compatible trace is found, we declare that the SUT is faulty. We use a Hybrid method in our approach which combines the use of both Interval Refinement and Simplex methods to improve the performance of passive fault detection.
Introduction
Passive fault detection is a fundamental part of passive testing which determines whether a system under test (SUT) is faulty by observing the input/output (I/O) behaviors of the SUT without interfering with its normal operations [10] . Compared with active fault detection, in which a tester has complete control over the inputs and devises a test sequence to reveal possible faults of the SUT, passive fault detection is more applicable under circumstances where the control is impractical or impossible, such as network fault management [10] .
In Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM)-based passive fault detection, the specification of an SUT N is modeled as an EFSM M, N is treated as a blackbox, and the observed I/O behaviors of N is represented as a sequence E of observed I/O events. Determining whether N is faulty with respect to M is then based on the existence of traces in M that are compatible with E, i.e., a trace in M is compatible with E if E maps to a sequence of consecutive transitions of M starting at a state s of M . If the number of traces in M compatible with E is zero, then E is sufficient to determine that N is faulty. Otherwise, E is declared to be insufficient to determine whether N is faulty, i.e., there is at least one trace in M compatible with E and E needs to be augmented with additional I/O events of N to continue with passive fault detection.
Usually, EFSM-based passive fault detection approaches are derived from Finite State Machine-based passive fault detection approaches. The FSM-based fault detection approach in [9] checks the observed sequence of I/O events oneby-one from the beginning, and reduces the size of the set S ′ of possible current states by eliminating impossible states until either S ′ is empty (N is faulty) or there is at least one state in S ′ (no fault is detected). The approach in [9] has been applied for passive fault detection in FSM-based systems [22, 23] . This approach has been extended to systems specified in the EFSM model by [7, 10, 11, 21] and adopted to systems specified in the Communicating Finite State Machine (CFSM) model by [14, 15, 16, 17, 18] . Another approach to EFSM-based passive fault detection focuses on characterizing specifications of an SUT in terms of invariants [3, 4, 5, 6] .
This paper proposes a new approach for EFSM-based passive fault detection which is summarized as follows: assume that the subset S 0 of states of M contains all possible starting states of E. Randomly pick a state s in S 0 and determine whether there exists a trace in M that starts at s and is compatible with E. If such a trace is found, then stop and declare that E is not sufficient to determine whether N is faulty. In this case, the starting state and the current state of N can be determined readily using this trace. Otherwise, continue to check other states in S 0 . After checking all the states in S 0 , if no trace in M is found to be compatible with E, then N will be declared faulty.
The proposed approach provides information about possible starting state and possible trace compatible with E at the end of passive fault detection. Such information cannot be provided by the existing approaches derived from [9] unless a post-processing is performed or a backward checking approach is taken for exploring the information about possible starting state and possible trace [1, 2] . In addition, the proposed approach utilizes a Hybrid method to evaluate constraints in predicates associated with transitions in an EFSM which combines the use of both Interval Refinement [8, 19] and Simplex [13] methods for performance improvement during passive fault detection. We show that using only the Interval Refinement method has a similar performance to the Hybrid method but suffers from inaccuracy whereas using only the Simplex method has the same accuracy as the Hybrid method but suffers from poor performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives preliminaries needed for our discussion, including definitions and notations used in our presentation. Section 3 presents the proposed approach for EFSM-based passive fault detection in detail. Section 4 provides experimental evaluations. Section 5 concludes this paper with some final remarks and directions for future research.
Preliminaries
The proposed approach for EFSM-based passive fault detection is based on the specification of SUT N given as a Simplified Extended Finite State Machine (SEFSM) and the sequence of I/O behaviors a tester observes during the execution of N given as a sequence E of observed I/O events.
A Simplified Extended Finite State Machine (SEFSM) M is (S, E m ,x, T ):
1. S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } is a finite set of states; 2. E m is a finite set of I/O events. e(ȳ) ∈ E m is an input or output event, and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y p ) is a vector of parameters of the I/O event e, called local variables; 3.x = (x 1 , . . . , x r ) is a vector of global variables which are accessible within all transitions; 4. T is a finite set of transitions.
The difference betweenȳ andx is thatȳ is observable from SUT N whilē x is unobservable. Note that all variables are integers. An example SEFSM is shown in Figure 1 . 1. s i is the starting state of t; 2. s j is the ending state of t;
3. e(ȳ) ∈ E m is an input event prefixed with "?" or output event prefixed with "!" that can be observed once t is activated; 4. P (x,ȳ) is a predicate expressing the conditions to be satisfied for the activation of t which consists of conjunctive terms, each of which is defined as a constraint, connected by " ∧ " (and) operators; 5. A(x,ȳ) is an action consisting of a sequence of assignment statements, each updating a global or local variable as a function of elements ofx andȳ.
Examples of an I/O event, predicate, and action are: "!display(y)" is an I/O event "display" which outputs the value of y, "
" is a predicate, and "x 3 := 3 × x 1 + (-1) × x 2 + (-5); x 1 := x 3 ;" is an action, respectively. Becauseȳ is observable from N whilex is unobservable, the I/O events with global variables as parameters must be modified. For example, if x is a global variable, an input event "?read(x )" will be transformed to "?read(a) x :=a;" where a is a local variable and the action "x :=a;" assigns the value of a to x ; similarly, an output event "!display(x )" will be transformed to "!display(a) [a = x ]" where the predicate "[a = x ]" guarantees the output value is equal to the value of x.
In this paper, a constraint cs is represented by k i=1 a i x i = I (a i is a coefficient, x i is a global variable, I is an interval) after replacing the local variables ofȳ by the actual values of the parameters observed during the execution of N. For example, the constraint "
. MAX is defined as 1 ×10 7 and MIN is defined as -1 ×10 7 in this paper.
Note that an event-driven extended finite state machine (EEFSM) model is used in [10] . The differences between EEFSM and SEFSM models are as follows: the SEFSM model simplifies the structure of predicates in transitions by eliminating the "or" operator in EEFSM. Therefore, in SEFSM, a transition is executable if and only if all the constraints in the predicate are evaluated to be TRUE. Also, in actions associated with transitions in EEFSM, [10] only considered the assignment statements where the left hand side is a global variable, whereas we consider both global and local variables to be on the left hand side of assignment statements.
The which the variables inx can take; 4. CS(x) records the constraints on variables inx. These constraints are obtained from both predicates and actions. As CS(x) contains only global variables, we shall henceforth use CS as the abbreviation of CS(x). Figure 2 ) According to configuration c in Figure 2 , 3 observed I/O events have been checked; the current possible state of N is s 6 ; the value of x 1 is greater or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 5, and the value of x 2 is greater or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 2; the values of x 1 and Fig. 2 . A configuration c x 2 must satisfy two constraints "x 1 + x 2 ≥ 0" and "3x 1 − x 2 ≤ 9" at the same time.
A trace represents the sequence of status of the SUT N during EFSM-based passive fault detection. Trace-Tree records all the traces that have been checked during EFSM-based passive fault detection. 
The Proposed Approach
Given a specification SEFSM M of an SUT N, a sequence E of observed I/O events, and S 0 ⊆ S, the proposed approach proceeds as follows:
1. Pick an unchecked state s from S 0 ; 2. Build a Trace-Tree for s by finding all the possible traces starting from state s ∈ S 0 ; 3. If a compatible trace of E is found, declare this trace as a compatible trace of E ; if no compatible trace of E can be found in Trace-Tree for s, go to (1); 4. If all states in S 0 have been checked and no compatible trace of E is found, declare that "N is faulty".
Algorithm Main
In algorithm M ain, we randomly select a state s from S 0 ⊆ S of SEFSM M and try to find a compatible trace of E starting from s. If trace is found to be a compatible trace of E, this algorithm will terminate and declare trace as a compatible trace of E ; if all the states in S 0 have been checked and no compatible trace of E is found, the algorithm will report "N is faulty".
Algorithm 1 Algorithm Main 1: Given: an SEFSM M, 2: a sequence E of observed I/O events, and 3: S0 = { s1, s2, · · · , sn} 4: Return: "N is faulty", or "trace is a compatible trace of E " 5: Begin: 6:
while (S0 = ∅) 7:
randomly select a state s from S0; 8:
S0 ← S0 \{ s } ; 9:
trace ← Search Trace Tree(M, s, E );{search for a compatible trace of E } 10:
If (trace = NULL) 11:
return ("trace is a compatible trace of E "); 12: endwhile 13:
return ("N is faulty"); {no compatible trace of E is found} 14: End
Algorithm Search Trace Tree
Algorithm Search Trace Tree searches for a compatible trace of E starting from a state s using the data structures for configuration and Trace-Tree.
Algorithm Check Trace and the Hybrid method
A trace consists of a sequence of configurations which represents the sequence of changes in the status of N through E. Algorithm Check Trace(M , trace, E, Tree) checks if there is a trace compatible with E. It first initializes the current configuration c current to the first configuration from trace, sets the current possible state s to the state in c current and gets the observed I/O event e to be considered from E. Then, all transitions in M starting from s (i.e., set T s of transitions) are checked one by one. Those transitions passing both control portion and data portion fault detection will be considered as executable transitions corresponding to the observed I/O event e. As there may be more than one executable transition, algorithm Check Trace picks the first one of them to continue checking and adds all other transitions as branches into the Trace-Tree Tree. The procedure of checking a Trace-Tree is described in Figure 3 . In Figure  3 , Tree consists of three traces. For example, when checking configuration c 11 , there exist two executable transitions, t 121 and t 122 . For each executable transition, a new configuration will be built. For c 21 , which corresponds to the first executable transition t 121 , we add c 21 to the end of trace 1 ; for c 22 , we build a new trace, trace 3 , and set c 22 as the starting configuration of trace 3 . Then we continue checking trace 1 with c 21 . trace 3 will be checked if and only if trace 1 and trace 2 are determined not compatible with E. Whenever a compatible trace of E is found, algorithm Check Trace returns this trace.
When searching for executable transitions within algorithm Check Trace, two steps are applied to a transition t ∈ T s : In the first step, which corresponds to function control portion checking in algorithm Check Trace, we compare the I/O To solve this CSP, the Interval Refinement method can be used, as done in [10] . However, because of the dependency problem, the results of the Interval Refinement method may not be accurate, i.e., some transitions may falsely be reported as executable. For example: assume a configuration c with c.[x] : x 1 = [1, 2], x 2 = [1, 2], x 1 and x 2 are integers; c.CS: {cs : x 1 − x 2 = 0;} , and check two transitions t 1 with a constraint cs 1 in its predicate as: x 1 + x 2 = 3; t 2 with a constraint cs 2 in its predicate as: x 1 + x 2 ≤ 4. By applying the Interval Refinement method, both transition t 1 and t 2 will be judged as executable. However, t 1 is not executable because x 1 and x 2 are integers and there is no solution for both cs and cs 1 at the same time. To guarantee the correctness of results, the Simplex method can be used instead of the Interval Refinement method, as done in [11] . Although the Simplex method is accurate, it is slower than the Interval Refinement method. Another difference between these two methods is that, in the Interval Refinement method, the intervals are narrowed; while in the Simplex method, the intervals will be untouched.
To combine the advantages of both the Interval Refinement and Simplex methods, we propose a Hybrid method, which is as accurate as the Simplex method and as efficient as the Interval Refinement method. The proposed Hybrid method uses both of these two methods judiciously as follows: given the set T s of transitions, the current configuration c current , and an observed I/O event e, first the Interval Refinement method, together with function control portion checking, is used to decide which transitions in T s are executable. If no transition in T s is evaluated to be executable, the current trace will be determined not compatible with E. If more than one transition is evaluated to be executable, the Simplex method will be applied to check the correctness of the Interval Refinement method in declaring these transitions executable. If only one transition is evaluated to be executable by the Interval Refinement method, the Simplex method will not be applied because this transition will be evaluated by the Simplex method implicitly by checking the last configuration of this trace. That is, at the end of a trace, before the trace is determined to be compatible with E, the Simplex method is applied to confirm that there exists no inconsistency in the last configuration of this trace. For example, consider a trace trace (c 1 c 2 . . . c k , k ≤ |E | ) in the Trace-Tree Tree. If c k is checked by the Simplex method and no inconsistency is found, trace is guaranteed to be compatible with a prefix of E (e 1 e 2 . . . e k , k ≤ |E |) because c k contains all the constraints within the configurations from c 1 to c k−1 . Therefore, if no inconsistency found in the last configuration of trace by the Simplex method, the transitions associated with trace are all executable.
After evaluating all the transitions in T s , we continue to perform actions by function action(t c , e, c) on the configurations in C with their corresponding transitions in T s . After performing actions, we add the first configuration in C to the end of trace and continue to check trace starting from this configuration. Other configurations in C will be considered as the initial configuration of new branches, which are represented as new traces in the Trace-Tree.
In function Interval Refinement(c.[x], c.CS, newCS ), the interval arithmetic operations are applied to narrow the intervals of variables in constraints [19] . During refinement, if the interval of a variable is empty, an inconsistency is detected and function Interval Refinement returns FALSE. Otherwise, c.[x] is updated based on the new constraints newCS and newCS is added into the set c.CS.
In function Simplex (c.[x], c.CS, ∅ ), we adopt an open source tool lp solve which is a free linear programming solver based on the revised Simplex method and the Branch-and-bound method [11, 12] . If no solution exists, function Simplex returns FALSE. Both c.[x] and c.CS are unchanged within function Simplex.
The worst case computational complexities of Interval Refinement and Simplex methods are exponential. [10, 11, 20] show that the average complexities of both methods in practice are polynomial. However, because the Simplex method is more complex than the Interval Refinement method, the speed of the Simplex method is slower than that of the Interval Refinement method. However, the use of the Simplex method in conjunction with the Interval Refinement method does not adversely affect the efficiency of the Hybrid method because the frequency of applying the Simplex method in the Hybrid method is very low; and the Interval Refinement method narrows the intervals which helps reduce the cost of applying the Simplex method.
Function action
When a transition has been evaluated to be executable, a new configuration will be constructed to record the status of SUT N after this transition. The construction of a new configuration depends on the action part, A(x,ȳ), in the transition which consists of a sequence of assignment statements. Given a configuration c in the set of configurations built for all executable transitions, an observed I/O event e and a transition t c corresponding to c, function action(t c , e, c) performs the actions associated with t c , and builds a new configuration rences of LHV with [x q ] and add the assignment to c.CS as a new constraint. For example, the assignment "x 1 := x 2 + x 3 -3" can be added as a constraint "x 2 + x 3x 1 = 3". Note that in [10] , in the situation where LHV does not appear in RHE, all the constraints in c.CS containing LHV will be discarded. However, those discarded constraints may contain constraints on not only LHV but also other global variables. Considering this, we keep those constraints and replace LHV in them by the interval of LHV in [x].
Optimization on Constraints
In algorithm Check Trace and function action, evaluating and storing constraints are complex and time consuming. In order to reduce the complexity, we optimize the constraint related operations as follows: First, the values of global variables are represented by intervals. For a variable x i = [x i , x i ], if its lower bound is equal to its higher bound (i.e. x i = x i ), [10] considers the value of variable x i as a determined value. Whenever the value of a global variable is determined, [10] replaces this variable in constraints with its determined value. For example, given the variable x 1 = [1, 1] and a constraint cs:
], x 1 in cs can be replaced by 1. Therefore, the new constraint after replacement would be cs: 4] . We adopt this replacement strategy in our approach.
Second, consider the situation in which a new constraint cs contains a single variable in the expression, for example x 1 ≤ 8. It would be unnecessary to check cs with former constraints in c.CS and keep it in c.CS. Instead, we use cs to directly narrow the interval of this variable in [x] . For example, given the existing interval of x 1 in [x] as x 1 = [0, 20], and a new constraint cs as x 1 ≤ 8, the narrowed interval is x 1 = [0, 8]. If the narrowed interval is not empty, we use the narrowed interval to replace the existing interval in [x] . Otherwise, we report that an inconsistency is found.
Third, when searching for a compatible trace of E, a transition t in M may be encountered more than once, i.e. the observed I/O event e i and e k (i = k) in E may correspond to the same transition t in M. In this case, we may have two constraints cs 1 : and cs 2 :cs 1 : k i=1 a i x i = I 1 and cs 2 :
z is a constant. We will call cs 1 and cs 2 similar. For example, x 1 + x 2 = [1, 2] and 3x 1 + 3x 2 = [0, 9] are similar. Then, given a new constraint cs, if there is a constraint within c current .CS that is similar to cs, we can reduce the number of constraints that need to be checked by the Hybrid method. In order to determine whether there is a constraint cs ′ in current CS that is similar to cs, we apply the following algorithm (called Similarity Checking) before checking cs with function Interval Refinement. If a constraint cs ′ similar to cs is found, we replace the interval of constraint cs ′ .I by (cs ′ .I × z ) ∩ cs.I. Thus, by applying algorithm Similarity Checking, we can reduce the number of constraints that need to be checked by the Hybrid method. 
Experiments
We made an experimental comparison of Interval Refinement, Simplex and Hybrid methods for EFSM-based passive fault detection on the ATM system of Figure 1 . Within the SEFSM ATM, there are five global variables, i.e.x = (attempts, pin, lang, op, cb); seven states, i.e. S 0 = {s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s 6 }; and fifteen transitions. Local variables are defined within transitions. Each global variable is assigned an interval standing for its initial values. S 0 is determined by the tester according to the specific application at hand. In this experiment, S 0 is chosen to be equal to S.
In the experiment, we considered two cases. In Case I, called correct implementation, there is at least one trace in M that is compatible with E and this compatible trace is expected to be reported. In this case, we randomly generate a sequence E s of observed I/O events ( |E s | = 1000) based on the SEFSM ATM and starting from state s 0 . Within E s , we randomly select five sequences with lengths of 20, 50, 100, 200, and 500 observed I/O events.
In Case II, called faulty implementation, there is no trace in M that is compatible with E and "faulty" is expected to be reported. First, we create a faulty specification AT M ′ from ATM by altering the next state, expanding a constraint in the predicate, or narrowing a constraint in the predicate of a randomly selected transition. Then, we randomly generate a sequence E s of observed I/O events ( |E s | = 1000) based on the SEFSM AT M ′ and starting from state s 0 . Within E s , we randomly select ten sequences containing the altered transition with length of 30 observed I/O events.
We compared three implementations. The first implementation is the Hybrid method; the second implementation replaces the Hybrid method by the Interval Refinement method so that a transition is checked only by the Interval Refinement method (the same as in [10] ); the third implementation replaces the Hybrid method by the Simplex method so that a transition is checked only by the Simplex method (the same as in [11] ).
According to the results, in Case I, all three implementations successfully find the corresponding traces. In Case II with next state fault and expanded constraint fault, all three implementations report fault correctly. But, the fault with narrowed constraint cannot be detected by all the three implementations because an observed I/O event generated by narrowed constraint will certainly satisfy the original constraint. Figure 4 , left, compares the efficiency of these three implementations in terms of the average time cost. According to the results, the Interval Refinement method requires the least amount of time; the Hybrid method requires a little bit more time than the Interval Refinement method; and the Simplex method is the most expensive in terms of time. As the length of sequence E of observed I/O events increases, the time consumed for these three methods all increases.
Moreover, to compare the rate of increase of time costs, along with the increase of |E | , we compute the average rate of time costs between (1) Simplex method and Interval Refinement method (Simplex/IR); (2) Hybrid method and Interval Refinement method (Hybrid/IR). In Figure 4 , right, we see that the time costs of the Interval Refinement method and Hybrid method are quite similar and, with the increase in the length of E, the difference between these two methods is not noticeable. We also see that the time cost of the Simplex method is much more than that of the Interval Refinement method, and as the length of E increases, the disparity between these two methods also increases. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed an approach for EFSM-based passive fault detection which provides information about possible starting state and possible trace at the end of passive fault detection; and utilizes a Hybrid method which combines the use of both Interval Refinement and Simplex methods for performance improvement during passive fault detection. Through experiments, we show that, compared with using only the Interval Refinement or only the Simplex method, the Hybrid method guarantees the correctness of results with a reasonable time cost. In future research, some model checking techniques can be adopted in the proposed approach for EFSM-based passive fault detection to help exploring the Trace-Tree. Also, it would be interesting to see how our proposed approach can help solving the problems of fault location and fault identification.
